This paper shows a new philosophical turn towards a new realism emerging today. And its originality lies on Maurizio Ferraris, who has recently published his Manifiesto del nuevo realismo**, which has been followed by personalities such as Umberto Eco and John Searle. On this basis, Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot and me have written our Manifiesto del nuevo realismo analógico***, which had had a great acceptance by Maurizio Ferraris himself. He translated our manifest and introduced it into Italy. I will take (...) this article as a chance to thank him for reading and considering our manifest. To sum up, what I will show is article is a picture of new realism from analogical hermeneutics point of view and the reason why we choose the analogical focus on it to be accurate. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene por objetivo responder al problema de la falta de sentido en el que se ve inmerso nuestro tiempo presente. Consideramos que la propuesta de Mauricio Beuchot, de una hermenéutica analógica, pensada aquí como política de la interpretación, es la mejor opción para problematizar y proponer respuestas al estado de situación actual, ya que evita desbordes que nos lleven hacia la inconmensurabilidad, y que cierren el paso a una acción transformadora, que, al mismo tiempo, sea acción constructora de (...) nuevos campos semánticos. Para esto, pondremos en tensión a la modernidad caracterizada como univocista, con la posmodernidad –regulada desde la tríada: relativismo-escepticismo-nihilismo– de tipo equivocista. Será importante tener en cuenta el valor que aquí le otorgamos al contexto de producción e interpretación textual, el cual se vuelve punto de referencia siempre necesario, que niega toda idea equivocista, sobre una semiosis sin fin. (shrink)

School climate is a multidimensional construct that has been related to a series of psychological, social, and school variables. The dual school climate and school identification measure-student (SCASIM-St) is a measure that has a multidimensional factor structure, with four first-order factors and a second-order factor, plus an independent factor that evaluates school identification. However, the SCASIM-St is long, with 38 items measuring school climate. The first objective of this study was to examine the psychometric properties of reliability and validity of (...) the abbreviated version of the dual school climate and school identification measure-student (SCASIM-St-15), for use in contexts with time limitations or for explanatory studies that need to apply multiple instruments simultaneously. The second objective was to analyze the degree of invariance for the groups: sex, type of education, and age. The sample was made up of 2,044 students of both sexes (49.1% women and 50.9% men), with a mean age of 14.64 (SD = 0.718), representing 27 secondary schools in Chile. The results indicated that the SCASIM-St15 presents adequate indicators of reliability and construct validity. Evidence of external criterion validity confirmed significant associations with the Attitudes to Institutional Authority in Adolescence Scale measure. The results of the factorial invariance analysis indicate that the SCASIM-St15 remains stable up to the level of metric invariance for the variable sex and the level of scalar invariance for the variables type of education and age. The study concluded that despite the significant decrease in the number of items, the SCASIM-St15 measures school climate in a reliable and valid way, without losing its theoretical and conceptual robustness. (shrink)

Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.

The purpose of this study is to identify the elements that can be implemented to achieve an ethical infrastructure, in small and medium enterprises. The ethical infrastructure is considered as a set of formal and informal systems, leadership, climate and culture, related to ethical issues. The research was carried out through interviews and focus groups with managers from 28 companies in Madrid, all signatories to the Global Compact. The identified key elements in SMEs are leadership, informal managerial and formal communication. (...) This study also explores different factors that influence the effectiveness, implementation, and sustainability of the ethical infrastructure in SMEs, discovering some factors that can act as both accelerators and barriers such as pressure from customers. Additional findings regarding the concepts of ethics and corporate social responsibility in SMEs, dilemmas and characteristics of the culture and climate are also presented. (shrink)

A number of authors have noted that the key steps in Fitch’s argument are not intuitionistically valid, and some have proposed this as a reason for an anti-realist to accept intuitionistic logic (e.g. Williamson 1982, 1988). This line of reasoning rests upon two assumptions. The first is that the premises of Fitch’s argument make sense from an anti-realist point of view – and in particular, that an anti-realist can and should maintain the principle that all truths are knowable. The second (...) is that we have some independent reason for thinking that classical logic is not appropriate in this area. This paper explores these two assumptions in the context of Michael Dummett’s version of anti-realism, with particular reference to the argument from indefinite extensibility developed at various points in Dummett’s writings (e.g. Dummett 1991 Ch. 24). -/- Dummett argues that certain concepts, the indefinitely extensible concepts, are such that we cannot form a clear and determinate conception of all the objects that fall under them. The most familiar examples of indefinitely extensible concepts are mathematical. Dummett discusses the concepts ordinal number, real number, and natural number, which are indefinitely extensible because any conception that one might form of their complete extension can be extended to a more inclusive conception (as, for example, in Cantor’s proof of the non-denumerability of the set of real numbers). This paper argues that the concept of a truth is indefinitely extensible. This gives a Dummettian anti-realist an independent motivation for rejecting the classical understanding of the quantifiers in this area. At the same time, however, it places in doubt the admissibility of the knowability principle, which seems to involve quantification over the “totality” of truths. As Dummett is at pains to point out (1991: 316), some sentences that purport to quantify over the extension of an indefinitely extensible concept plainly have a truth-value (we can truly say, for example, that every ordinal number has a successor, even though when we say that we are not quantifying over the set of all ordinals). But is the knowability principle one of these sentences? (shrink)

"The book presents in accessible fashion recent important work on the self and self-consciousness and also moves the issues forward with interesting new ideas. It provides a notably crisp and clear treatment of some extremely intriguing topics." -- Jane Heal, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge In this book, José Luis Bermú dez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in (...) terms of more fundamental capacities? (2) Can we explain how fully fledged self-conscious thought and language can arise in the normal course of human development? Bermú dez argues that a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) arises from the apparent strict interdependence between self-conscious thought and linguistic self-reference. The paradox renders circular all theories that define self-consciousness in terms of linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun. It seems to follow from the paradox of self-consciousness that no such account or explanation can be given. Drawing on recent work in empirical psychology and philosophy, the author argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of self-consciousness that are prelinguistic and preconceptual. Such primitive forms of self-consciousness are to be found in somatic proprioception, the structure of exteroceptive perception, and prelinguistic forms of social interaction. The author uses these primitive forms of self-consciousness to dissolve the paradox ofself-consciousness and to show how the two questions can be given an affirmative answer. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for a naturalistic solution to some of the methodological controversies in regulatory science, on the basis of two case studies: toxicology and health claim regulation. We analyze the debates related to the scientific evidence that is considered necessary for regulatory decision making in each of those two fields, with a particular attention to the interactions between scientific and regulatory aspects. This analysis allows us to identify two general stances in the debate: a) one that argues (...) for more permissive standards of evidence and for methodological pluralism, and b) an opposing one that not only defends strict evidence requirements but also stipulates the use of one particular scientific methodologies for data generation. We argue that the real-world outcomes produced by alternative regulatory options are a vital piece of information that allows for the empirical assessment of these two stances. In particular, this information on outcomes makes it possible to analyze which standards of evidence and scientific methods generate the most useful knowledge as input for regulatory decision making. Our conclusion is that instead of an a priori selection of methodologies and standards, such decisions ought to be based on empirical evidence related to real-world outcomes. (shrink)

Este trabalho agencia a obra de Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari à educação em ciências ao jogar luzes sobre o deslocamento que permeia a organização deste componente curricular. O uso destes autores para pensarmos a educação em ciências, possibilita a (re)inserção da diferença e da multiplicidade, extirpadas do estrato científico pelo sonho moderno de totalização da realidade – que persiste no pedagógico – por meio da redução conceitual operada pela lógica da identidade. Assim, evidencia as (des)continuidades das práticas entre um (...) estrato e outro, como resultado da força de uma tradição que passa a ser subvertida pelo corte epistemológico deleuzo-guattariano. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.

Penn et al. propose the relational reinterpretation hypothesis as an explanation of the profound discontinuities that they identify between human and nonhuman cognition. This hypothesis is not a genuine replacement for the explanations that they reject, however, because as it stands, it simply redescribes the phenomena it is trying to explain.

Are philosophy and literature allies or enemies in Jorge Luis Borges's fictions? In this paper, I argue that Borges can satisfy membership in the allies camp because his fictions provide the imaginative scenarios the allies believe are so necessary to this coalition; however, because his stories question philosophy's hold on reality, they can also seem to fall into the enemies camp by countervailing any claim philosophy has on reality and truth; although, ultimately, the manner in which Borges forges an (...) alliance between philosophy and literature will be for reasons not traditionally accepted by those in either the allies or enemies camps. (shrink)

Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, and Agency by Thomas (...) Baldwin 7 At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism by James Russell 8 Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View by José Luis Bermúdez 9 Proprioception and the Body Image by Brian O’Shaughnessy 10 Awareness of One’s Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis by Marcel Kinsbourne 11 Body Schema and Intentionality by Shaun Gallagher 12 Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects by Jonathan Cole and Jacques Paillard 13 Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership by M. G. F. Martin 14 Bodily Awareness and the Self by Bill Brewer 15 Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription by Quassim Cassam 16 Consciousness and the Self by Naomi Eilan Contributors Index. (shrink)

Este ensaio aborda a problemática do corpo na educação em ciências. Para tanto, toma como exemplo o corpo utópico utilizado na ciência, colocando-o em uma perspectiva crítica a partir do seu não reconhecimento como modelo corporal. Como contraponto, trabalha com a ideia de corpo heterotópico, como corpo real, singular, que se produz e se traduz como prática de resistência. A partir deste conceito evidencia-se o potencial da educação em ciências para a estetização da ciência, recolocando a discussão do reconhecimento e (...) da autodeterminação do outro como pauta para uma agenda formativa humanística, comprometida com uma ético-estética das alteridades na ciência. (shrink)

Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.

Regulatory science, which generates knowledge relevant for regulatory decision?making, is different from standard academic science in that it is oriented mainly towards the attainment of non?epistemic (practical) aims. The role of uncertainty and the limits to the relevance of academic science are being recognized more and more explicitly in regulatory decision?making. This has led to the introduction of regulation?specific scientific methodologies in order to generate decision?relevant data. However, recent practical experience with such non?standard methodologies indicates that they, too, may be (...) subject to important limitations. We argue that the attainment of non?epistemic values and aims (like the protection of human health and the environment) requires not only control of the quality of the data and the methodologies, but also the selection of the level of regulation deemed adequate in each specific case (including a decision about which of the two, under?regulation or over?regulation, would be more acceptable). (shrink)

A central discussion in the theory of deliberative democracy in recent decades has focused on whether democratic deliberation, and consequently those participating in it, should aim, at least ideally, for political consensus. Thus, pluralist deliberative democrats have criticized the consensualist approach to deliberative democracy for neglecting the moral importance of political disagreement because of their fixation with reaching consensus. The debate between these two positions, initiated in the 1990s, has evolved in recent years toward more precision and sophistication. However, some (...) vagueness and ambiguities remain in many of the contributions and prevent us from getting an exact idea of the object of discussion. This article starts making further distinctions about several types of agreement and disagreement in order to clarify much more precisely the exact niche of dispute between these two views. They do not need to disagree on the value of many forms of disagreement and consensus. Their dispute consists only in a controversy about the relative value of post-deliberative, operative, substantive, legislative, regulatory, or adjudicative reason-based consensus as opposed to the corresponding reason-based disagreement. Finally, the article argues that this relatively small niche is made smaller by certain considerations. The most important of them is that this controversy remains at a high theoretical level and lacks practical importance: it only affects the kind of personal ideal commitment or aspiration that virtuous deliberators should have when entering into a deliberative process, and has no concrete consequent institutional implications. (shrink)

O Prof. Sigrist, como acadêmico, não foi um profissional da escrita, são poucos os seus escritos. O Prof. Sigrist foi um profissional da palavra, do discurso, e conseguia abusar da sua memória. Usava poucas anotações para as suas falas, mas cabia aos alunos lerem suas indicações bibliográficas.

Le débat sur le rôle des valeurs en science survient également dans les sciences appliquées, en particulier dans les sciences régulatives. Nous proposons une analyse, sous l’angle des valeurs, des controverses récentes sur le rôle de la connaissance scientifique dans la régulation des risques technologiques. Nous distinguons trois perspectives sur les valeurs cognitives et non-cognitives, dans le contexte de l’évaluation et de la gestion du risque. Notre analyse montre que les deux types de valeurs interagissent au sein du processus de (...) génération de connaissances dans les sciences régulatives, et que des propositions de changements méthodologiques dépendent de la reconnaissance explicite du rôle opérant des valeurs. Notre contribution indique que l’analyse philosophique des valeurs peut aider à clarifier les controverses actuelles sur les risques technologiques. (shrink)

Pascal, in his Mémorial, contraposed the God of philosophers and the God of Abraham, of Jacob and of Jesus Christ. John Paul II, in Crossing the threshold of Hope, enters into dialogue with this Pascalian thought. The author analizes step by step, this confrontation, making it manifest that John Paul II advocates a style of philosophy which has a strong existential emphasis. Only such a philosophy explains, according to the thought of John Paul II, the truth as much about God (...) as about man. (shrink)

The author challenges the view that birth cannot be a morally relevant fact in the process of development from zygote to child. He reviews specific arguments against giving any moral significance to the fact of birth. Drawing on recent work in developmental psychology, he contends that the lives of neonates can have a level of self-consciousness that confers moral significance but can only be possessed after birth. He shows that the position he has argued for provides a framework within which (...) the move from the moral validity of aborting sentient fetuses to the moral validity of infanticide might be resisted. He concludes that arguments suggesting that birth can be morally significant support the view that the acquisition of moral significance is a gradual and multilayered phenomenon. (shrink)

Forms of thinking that involve thinking about thought are only available to creatures participating in a public language. Thoughts can only be the objects of further thoughts if they have suitable vehicle and the only suitable vehicle is public language sentences. These language-dependent cognitive abilities range from second-order reflection on one's own beliefs and desires and the capacity to attribute thoughts to others to the ability to entertain tensed thoughts and to deploy logical concepts. Many of these language-dependent cognitive abilities, (...) however, have primitive analogues that do not involve intentional ascent and hence are available at the nonlinguistic level. This chapter considers the practical implications this has for the scope and limits of nonlinguistic thought. The chapter explores the question: what types of thinking are in principle unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures? There are two types of intentional ascent, which might be termed explicit and implicit intentional ascent respectively. (shrink)

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

Este escrito surgió de la lectura del libro de M.ª Isabel Lafuente, Libertad, ley y poder. Bien común y Derechos humanos en la obra de Francisco Suárez (Editorial Académica Española, Berlín, 2022, 482 pp.), que se comenta a continuación. El foco de mi comentario en diálogo con este estudio es triple. Primeramente, señalar la importancia que la obra de Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) tuvo principalmente durante los siglos xvii-xviii y la variación de perspectiva y método que la filosofía moderna introdujo con (...) respecto al hacer de la escolástica y de la propia filosofía iusnaturalista de Suárez. En segundo lugar, indicar la recuperación y actualidad de Suárez en el presente. Y, en último lugar, ofrecer la estructura y los contenidos principales del libro de M.ª Isabel Lafuente con una breve conclusión. (shrink)

Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.

Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...) satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all. (shrink)

How precisely to understand and evaluate counterfactuals can be an intricate issue. The aim of this article is to examine a new set of difficulties for evaluating counterfactuals that arise in the context of the dynamical spacetimes described by the theory of general relativity (GR). The initial value formulation provides us with a methodology to pin down the specific combination of features of the theory at the origin of the difficulties, namely, non-linearity and certain non-local aspects (typically captured by ellipticity (...) at the analytical level), in particular when combined with the global and/or quasi-local character of physical quantities in GR. Finally, we connect the philosophical question about counterfactuals with concrete applied physical issues in GR about extracting meaningful predictions by constructing appropriate initial data sets, leading us to question the very suitability of the Cauchy approach to fully account for the explanatory power of the theory. (shrink)